Republic of the
Supreme
Court
EN BANC
RE: DISHONESTY AND/OR FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF MR.
ROGELIO M. VALDEZCO, JR., SC SUPERVISING JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, ACCOUNTING
DIVISION, FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE (FMBO). |
|
A.M. No. 2005-22-SC Present: PANGANIBAN,
Chief Justice PUNO,* QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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R E S O L U T I O N
GARCIA, J.:
This refers to a
Memorandum[1] of
Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief Administrative Officer, Office of the
Administrative Services (OAS), dated November 9, 2005, for then Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. concerning the charge of falsification of Daily Time
Record (DTR) allegedly committed by respondent Rogelio M. Valdezco, Jr.,
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, Accounting Division, Fiscal Management and
Budget Office (FMBO).
Records yield the following facts:
As recommended by the OAS in a
Memorandum[2] of
June 21, 2005, then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. approved the request of respondent
and nine (9) other Court
employees to render overtime
services effective June 27, 2005 to July 19, 2005. Included in the approval was the entitlement
of said employees to compensatory
time-off equivalent to the
number of hours they earned as overtime services subject to the condition that
overtime services shall be from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on weekdays and 8:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.
Pursuant to the approved overtime
scheme, respondent filed, on
In a Memorandum[4]
dated
In another Memorandum, Ms. San
Pedro apprised OAS Chief Administrative
Officer Eden T. Candelaria about the action taken on respondent’s leave
application. She also informed Atty. Candelaria that respondent was, at the time, enrolled in the
Thereafter, the OAS required respondent
to submit his comment on allegations contained in the Memorandum immediately
adverted to above.
In his letter-comment
dated
On
Mr.
Valdezco's [self-serving] reason cannot be given credence to justify his claim
for alleged overtime services he rendered for the period from 27 June to
Perusal
of the records tends to show that Mr. Veldezco committed an irregularity in
claiming for overtime services rendered as reflected in his DTRs since no basis
for overtime services rendered can attest whether he actually rendered the
alleged overtime services as recommended by Ms. San Pedro on the details of
action on application for leave.
Administrative
Circular No. 18-2005 provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, under the
Joint Circular, in lieu of overtime pay, the employees may use as
"time-off" the accrued number of hours of overtime service they
rendered.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr.
Valdezco should be reminded that the authority to render overtime services was
approved on the basis of his request "for the period effective upon
approval hereof up to 19 July 2005 x x x subject to the condition that they
start their overtime work at
Although it is not expressly provided in the said authority … that he has to register first his time-out for office hours before rendering any overtime and his time-in for the actual overtime, he nevertheless committed a fraud in claiming for his overtime services when in fact he did not render overtime services but actually attended his law classes at the PLM. The fact that he did not inform his Office at the time he requested for authority to render overtime creates a prima facie presumption of an irregularity with the end view of gaining some benefits for himself thereby causing damage to the Court and ultimately to the government. Clearly, from the very start there was a deliberate intent to defraud the Court. Classes usually start in the second week of June and at the time he requested his authority to render overtime services, he was already enrolled. x x x.
As
to his defense, that he entirely based his action on the same practice as that
of overtime with compensation or expense allowance, he erroneously relied on
it. Even granting that he relied his
actions on his previous practice, then why did Ms. San Pedro disapprove his
application for leave vis-à-vis his alleged overtime services? Was it because of his mere failure to observe
office rules and regulations or was it the timely discovery of the irregularity
in registering his overtime service for the period from 27 June to
Of
the two assumptions mentioned, the latter is more persuasive as it was
sufficiently proven by the facts and evidence, coupled with his admission. Good faith or mere judgmental error cannot be
appreciated to exonerate him administratively for dishonesty. Thus, when the irregularity was unearthed,
his succeeding claim for compensatory time-off was disapproved. For sure, his request for authority to render
overtime services will be denied if such information is made known to this
Office earlier. His act of not informing
his supervisor or this Office that he is officially enrolled and that he is
attending his law classes after office hours at the PLM when he applied for the
authority to render overtime services is a blatant act of committing
dishonesty. His claim that he is
entitled to compensatory time-off equivalent to the number of hours he
earned as a result of his overtime
services for the period from 27 June to
On the basis of
the foregoing premises, the OAS recommended that respondent be adjudged guilty
of dishonesty and/or falsification and ordered dismissed from the service with
all accessory penalties.
The recommendation
is flawed by the premises holding it together. As it were, respondent is
specifically being recommended for dismissal for the above charge/s owing to what
the OAS considers as his fraudulent application for entitlement to compensatory
time-off equivalent to the number of hours he earned for overtime services
rendered. As complainant OAS would have it appear, however, respondent did not
render overtime services as evidenced by his failure, during the period
material, to register his time-outs for regular office hour and his time-ins
for alleged overtime services rendered. To compound matters, according to the
OAS, respondent was attending his classes during the time he was supposed to be
engaged in overtime work.
Three (3) factual
premises are undisputed. Firstly, respondent indeed filed a claim for
compensatory time-off corresponding to the hours of his supposed overtime
credit. Secondly, he did not swipe his chronolog ID for office time-out and
time-in for overtime services rendered, thus leaving no solid verification basis
to determine whether or not overtime services were rendered on a given day.
Thirdly, respondent was enrolled at the PLM law school and in fact, has classes
during the pertinent dates.
Unless it is
sufficiently established that he committed acts amounting to falsification,
respondent cannot plausibly be adjudged liable for dishonesty for making a
fraudulent claim of entitlement for overtime compensatory time-off.
Accordingly, crucial in the determination of the charge for falsification of
DTR is the question of whether or not respondent rendered overtime service
during the subject dates
With the view we take of this case, the
commission of falsification cannot be deduced from the bare fact that
respondent, during the days he claimed to have rendered overtime services, failed
to swipe his ID in the CTRM to indicate time out for office hours and time-in
on weekday overtime services. Such failure cannot, without more, be considered
as substantial proof that respondent tried to hoodwink the Court by having his
ID reflect as, a matter of fact, something, i.e.,
the rendition of overtime services, that
did not actually transpire. Else, we
would be reading in such failure something not convincingly indicated by the
omission. This is not necessarily to say that respondent indeed rendered, as he
now claims, overtime on the days material. The bottom line, however, is that
such failure is insufficient to support a conclusion of wrongdoing on the part
of respondent.
Lest it be
overlooked, the OAS, no less, admits the silence of the governing Administrative
Circular (AO) No. 18-2005 as to the requirement for respondent to register
first his time-out for office hours before rendering any overtime and his
time-in for the actual overtime. As it were then, what respondent did, or what
he did not do, to be precise, the
time-out time-in referred to above was not in violation of AC No. 18-2005.
Neither in our
mind can the fact of respondent being enrolled at the PLM be taken as prima facie indicia of his commission of
falsification. As the Court distinctly notes, no evidence had been presented that respondent
was attending his law
class at the
precise date and time he was supposed to be rendering overtime work. To be sure, on
the subject dates, respondent
reported for work during his official
time. If at all, the certification obtained from the PLM
College of Law that respondent was enrolled at that
institution only proves the fact of enrollment, but not necessarily that,
during the period material, he was inside his classroom attending his late
afternoon and early
evening classes. Needless to stress, to complainant in administrative
proceedings rests the onus of proving, by substantive evidence, inculpatory
allegations in the complaint.[8]
Complainant does not appear to have discharged its burden under the premises.
Certainly not lost
on the Court is what the OAS said in its Memorandum, thus:
In this case,
since the document
falsified is the daily time record, it is imperative that there be proof of
damage to the government. Such damage may take the form of salary paid to the
employee for services not rendered. In
view of the fact that no proof would tell that Mr. Valdezco unduly benefited
from his daily time records with regard to his alleged overtime services rendered,
he cannot be held administratively liable for falsification of official
documents. It shows that his daily time records were not absolutely false. In other words, there was a color of truth in
the entries in his DTRs as he did report for work during his official time but
not on the hours spent for overtime service as claimed by him.[9]
If respondent is
to be called to task for some misfeasance or nonfeasance, it is for requesting
authority to render overtime services knowing pretty well and without so much
as informing all concerned that he is enrolled in and is supposed to be in class
after office hours. Needless to stress, it behooved him to inform the
recommending and approving authority about his schooling. That he did not so
inform beclouds the bona fides of his
request to render overtime services. To be sure, no matter how well meant his
requests for overtime were, the same would have been denied had respondent
informed his immediate supervisor that he is officially enrolled and attending law
classes at PLM.
The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees[10], sets
forth the state’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. Specifically, Section 4 (c) thereof
provides:
(c) Justness
and sincerity.- Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people
at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity x x x They shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest.
The Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel[11] is
more exacting, enjoining as it does employees
of the judiciary to serve as sentinels of justice as any act of impropriety on
their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the
people’s confidence in it.
In all, the
Court finds respondent guilty for violating the strict
standards of honesty, integrity and uprightness,[12] a
violation which verily translates to acts prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
Accordingly, the Court
finds respondent guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.
Pursuant
to Rule IV, Section 52-A (20)
of the Uniform Rules On Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,
the imposable penalty therefor on first offense is suspension for a period of six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year.
It appears from the
records that respondent
has been in the judiciary for thirteen
(13) years. He was hired on
The Court observes
that it is not uncommon
for employees to do everything in their
power to better
their lot. However, let this
case serve as
a stern warning
to all that one’s pursuit of personal development
and improvement, without regard to the demands of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service, will never be countenanced by
this Court.[15]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Rogelio M.
Valdezco GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
(On leave) REYNATO S. PUNO Associate
Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate
Justice
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
*
On leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-9.
[2] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Montes vs. Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1627,
[9] Rollo, p. 7.
[10] Republic Act No. 6713.
[11] A.M. No.03-06-13-SC.
[12] Basco vs. Gregorio, A.M. No. P-94-1026,
[13] A.M.
No. CA-04-17-P, 444 SCRA 10,
[14] RE:
AC No. 04-AM-2002, Josejina Fria vs.
Gemiliana De Los Angeles, A.M. No. CA-02-15-P, 430 SCRA 412 (June 3, 2004).
[15] Consolacion A.
Lumancas and Yolando O. Uriarte vs. Virginia B. Intas, G.R. No. 133472,
December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 22.